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Abstract:  
In this paper, we propose the conception of within-group CD-curve, to apprehend the 
impact of indirect tax reforms on truncated distributions of consumption expenditures. 
This confers decision makers the ability to perform within-group transfers as well as 
between-group transfers to reduce poverty in particular groups or to obtain an overall 
poverty alleviation. Between-group transfers are implemented in order to introduce a 
fairness element into the indirect tax framework, allowing to test for  the robustness of 
reducing-tax reforms, for any order of stochastic dominance. 
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1 Introduction
Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991), subsequently Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990),
Makdissi and Wodon (2002), Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2005a), among
others, have introduced and analyzed the impact of transfers between indi-
viduals according to indirect taxation frameworks in order to yield decision
makers the ability to constitute poverty-reducing or welfare-improving fiscal
reforms. These standard tax reforms, for couple of goods {i, j}, consist in
financing a decreasing tax on i by increasing the tax on j.
Precisely, Makdissi and Wodon (2002) have initiated the use of a new
concept, that of Consumption Dominance diagram (CD-curve from now on)
in order to apprehend the impact of marginal indirect tax reforms on poverty,
for any order of restricted stochastic dominance. In other words, if the CD-
curve of good i dominates (lies above) that of good j, for any order, and
for all incomes below a defined poverty line, and if one increases the tax on
the j-th commodity and uses the proceeds to subsidize the i-th commodity,
then overall poverty declines, and conversely.1
These taxation procedures are relevant since, as pointed out by Duclos
et al. (2005a), they are compatible with various poverty indices that belong
to an overall class of poverty measures (Πs), with heterogeneous agents and
with any poverty line corresponding to any group of the population. Fur-
thermore, these dominance tests are appealing since they are less restrictive
than parametric tests and can be used for all units of consumption expendi-
tures and for any order of stochastic dominance. Moreover, theses orders of
dominance correspond to thorough ethical transfer principles. For instance,
dominance of order 2 implicitly assumes that a transfer of amount δ > 0 is
made from a higher-income individual to a lower-income one.
In this paper, we analyze the possibility to make transfers within groups
or between groups of the population. On the one hand, the within-group
CD-curves are introduced to conceive transfers inside a single group. This
yields very intuitive applications, e.g., an increasing tax on fuel in an urban
area may help to subsidize public transportation in the same area, implying
poverty reduction. On the other hand, between-group transfers are charac-
terized by taxing the j-th commodity in one group in order to subsidize, in
another group, the tax on the same j-th good or alternatively on another
commodity. One must think about cross-subsidies between different groups
1Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2005b) have applied this framework to direct transfer
reforms and Makdissi and Wodon (2007) to regulatory reforms.
2
of consumers of a public utility. These theoretical developments are par-
ticularly relevant for policy purposes since more freedom is attributed to
decision makers, which may easily find fiscal proceeds aiming at subsidizing
groups in needs with overall poverty alleviation. Accordingly, we propose
many tests based on dominance between within-group CD-curves. This al-
lows us to contemplate doing poverty-reducing tax reforms, provided that
within-group CD-curves do not intersect, for any given order of stochastic
dominance. This leads to a set of results for which it is not necessary to
impose an homogeneous taxation scheme on the whole distribution of goods
i and j, since it is possible to focus on truncated parts of these distributions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals
with assumptions characterizing the analytical forms of poverty and those
of taxation issues. Section 3 is devoted to the test specification of within-
and between-group transfers, showing that an equal treatment of the groups
in the taxation system provides a poverty-reducing tax reform. Afterwards,
introducing an assumption of fair treatment of the groups, we strengthen
our test for between-group redistribution and poverty decline, for any order
of stochastic dominance. Section 4 draws concluding remarks and advances
further researches.
2 Assumptions and Definitions
We suggest, on the one hand, a set of assumptions A in order to formalize the
poverty environment on which we intend to derive our results of stochastic
dominance. We test for poverty-reducing tax reforms using an additive
structure of poverty indices. An additive poverty index is defined as the
sum of individuals’s poverty p(·):
P (F, z) =
∫ a
0
p
(
yE(q, y), z
)
dF (y), (1)
where F is the cumulative distribution function defined over [0, a], yE the
equivalent incomes, a an integer greater than all yE, and z the poverty line
defined in the equivalent income space. The notation q symbolizes a vector
of unitary market prices e subject to taxes t.
As overall poverty is the sum of individuals’s poverty, each agent’s equiv-
alent income is compared with a sole common poverty line z ∈ R++. When
the population is partitioned into k groups, k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, the advantage
of working with such class of additive poverty indices is the possibility to
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conceptualize the overall poverty as the sum of poverty within each popu-
lation subgroup. Let pk
(
yE(q, y), zk
)
be the poverty function characterizing
group k’s poverty, where zk ≤ z+k , z+k ∈ R++ being the maximum conceivable
poverty line in group k.
Assumption 2.1: Additive Poverty. An additive index is defined as a
weighted average of poverty intensity within each group:
P (F, z) =
K∑
k=1
θk
∫ a
0
pk
(
yE(q, y), zk
)
dFk(y), (A1)
where θk is the population share of the k-th group and Fk(y) the cumulative
distribution function of group k defined over [0, a].2
The poverty level in the k-th group and the contribution of the k-th group
to the overall poverty ratio are respectively given by: pk(·) and θkpk(·). If
there exists in each group k at least one equivalent income yE lower than the
poverty line zk, then the strict positivity of pk(·) and θkpk(·) is guaranteed.
On the contrary, these are nil.
In the sequel, focus is principally put on poverty variations and particu-
larly on poverty alleviation. The property of differentiability is then imposed
to the class of additive poverty measures.
Assumption 2.2: Differentiability. The poverty measure is a s-time
differentiable continuous function almost everywhere over [0, a] such as:
(−1)upu1(·) ≥ (−1)upu2(·) ≥ . . . ≥ (−1)upuk(·) ≥ 0,∀u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}, (A2)
where puk(·) is the u-th derivative of the pk(·) function.
The class of poverty measures satisfying assumptions (A1) and (A2) is
denoted by Πs. It is a well suited class of indices (see Duclos et al. (2005a)
and Zheng (1999)) that involves the well-known FGT’s measures (Foster,
Greer and Thorbecke (1984)). For s ≥ 1, assumption (A2) implies that
an increase in household equivalent income yE diminishes poverty, for any
given household type. Furthermore, it postulates that, for any given house-
hold equivalent income yE, the needier the households are, the greater the
poverty alleviation may be. Although the difference in household needs
2Let nk be the size of group k and n be the size of the global population. Then,
θk = nkn .
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is usually interpreted as gaps in household sizes, this interpretation is less
appropriate in our framework. Here, suitable interpretations may be differ-
ences in health (handicapped versus non handicapped individuals), gender
(women versus men), ethnic and religious affiliations, as well as differences
in regions. For any given example, if divergences in capabilities are recorded
at the same income level (see Sen (1992)), such an assumption is relevant.
(A2)’s normative implications are more stringent than the usual ones for
first-order unidimensional dominance and can be viewed as a weak version
of the Pigou-Dalton principle, which is in fact equivalent to Sen’s Weak Eq-
uity Axiom (see Sen (1997), p. 18). For s ≥ 2, assumption (A2) postulates
that an equalizing transfer of δ > 0 from a richer person to a poorer one
decreases poverty, this effect being stronger across needier households. In-
deed, for higher s, the interpretation of (A2) can be made using Fishburn
and Willig’s (1984) general transfer principle, for which increasing weights
are associated with transfers occurring at the bottom of the distribution as
far as s increases. Hence, (A2) makes these properties, viewed as a gen-
eralization of Sen’s Weak Equity Axiom, normatively more important for
needier households. Finally, for any order s, we have Fishburn and Willig’s
normative interpretation of s-order unidimensional dominance (that is, the
interpretation of (−1)spsk(·) ≥ 0), coupled with a weak version of the tradi-
tional normative interpretation of (s+1)-order dominance (the interpretation
of (−1)spsk(·) ≥ (−1)spsk+1(·) in a sequential context).
Now, in order to define the indirect taxation environment used to gauge
the impact of fiscal reforms on poverty variations, it is possible to follow, on
the other hand, a set of assumptions B. We first require a revenue neutrality
assumption. This implicitly postulates that an increasing tax on a particular
good allows to finance a decreasing tax on another good, the fiscal revenue
being constant.
Assumption 2.3: Revenue Neutrality. If Xk =
∫ a
0
xk(y)dF (y) denotes
the aggregate average consumption of the k-th good, the per capita govern-
ment indirect tax revenue is R =
∑K
k=1 tkXk, k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, and revenue
neutrality is then formalized by:
dR = 0. (B1)
Afterwards, in order to capture the efficiency associated with a two-good
taxation fashion, the following definitions are required.
Definition 2.4: Differential Efficiency. Wildasin (1984) proposes an
efficiency parameter γij that captures the marginal social cost of raising $1 of
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public funds by taxing the j-th commodity and using the proceeds to subsidize
the i-th commodity. Suppose a M-good economy with i, j,m ∈ {1, . . . ,M},
then, if producers’s prices are constant, equation B1 brings out:
γij = −
dtj
dti
(
Xj
Xi
)
=
1 + 1
Xi
∑M
m=1 tm
∂Xm
∂ti
1 + 1
Xj
∑M
m=1 tm
∂Xm
∂tj
.
Subsequently, Besley and Kanbur (1988) determine the variation of the
equivalent income with respect to the tax rate variation of good i. Using
Roy’s identity and assuming that the observed price vector is the vector of
reference, they show that the change in equivalent incomes generated by a
marginal change of the tax rate of good i is:
∂yE
∂ti
= −xi(q, y), (2)
where xi(q, y) is the Marshallian demand of good i. On this basis, Makdissi
and Wodon (2002) define CD-curves in order to perform a s-order stochastic
dominance test.
Definition 2.5: CD-Curve of order s. The CD-Curve of order 1 for
good i is the ratio between an individual consumption with income y and the
aggregate consumption of good i: CD1i (y) = xi(y)/Xi · f(y), where f(y) is
the density function of per capita income, which is nil outside of the interval
[0, a].3 The CD-curve of order s is given by: CDsi (y) =
∫ y
0
CDs−1i (u)du.
3 Stochastic Dominance and Poverty-reducing Taxation
Following the previous assumptions and definitions, Makdissi and Wodon
(2002) propose a test that combines dominance between CD-curves, poverty
reduction, and indirect tax reforms. In spite of its attractiveness, it is
only concerned with overall poverty. To circumvent this issue, Duclos et al.
(2005a) suggest to deal with heterogenous agents. For this purpose, they use
(A1) and define the CD-Curve of order 1 for good i and for group k. It rep-
resents the ratio between an individual consumption of group k with income
y and the aggregate consumption of good i: C˜D
1
ik(y) = xik(y)/Xi · fk (y),
where fk (y) is the density function of per capita incomes of group k, with
3Makdissi and Wodon (2002) use the following definition CD1i (y) = xi(y)/Xi. How-
ever, Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2006) show that it is more helpful to use CD1i (y) =
xi(y)/Xi · f(y) for estimation purposes.
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fk (y) = 0 outside of the interval [0, a]. Subsequently, the s-order CD-curve
of group k for good i is given by: C˜D
s
ik(y) =
∫ y
0
C˜D
s−1
ik (u)du.
Theorem 3.1. Under conditions A1, A2 and B1, the two following propo-
sitions are equivalent:
(ı)
∑`
k=1 θk[C˜D
s
ik(y)− γijC˜D
s
jk(y)] ≥ 0, ∀y ≤ z+, ∀` ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}
(ıı) dP (F, z) ≤ 0, ∀zk ≤ z+k , ∀P (F, z) ∈ Πs, s ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
Proof. See the appendix.
Theorems 3.1 implies an homogeneous impact of the tax rates ti and tj
on the distributions of commodity expenditures i and j. Indeed, decreasing
overall poverty with an increasing tax on the j-th commodity may implicitly
entail a whole decreasing poverty for which poor can be more solicited than
rich, mainly if j is an inferior good. Here after, another issue is analyzed
with the assumption of equal treatment of the groups.
Assumption 3.2: Equal Treatment of the Groups. Let Rk be the fiscal
revenue obtained in group k. Revenue neutrality is the rule used in each k
group, if and only if:
dRk = 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (B2)
The above assumption may be coherent with a decentralized poverty
alleviation program in which each region must have a balanced budget. In
such a context, instead of examining C˜D-curves of any commodity for group
k based on the aggregate consumption of the population, we investigate
for CD-curves concerned with the aggregate consumption of each group
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Definition 3.3: Within-group CD-Curve of Order s. The first-order
within-group CD-curve of group k for good i is the ratio between an individual
consumption with income y and the aggregate consumption of his group k
for good i: CD1ik(y) = xik(y)/Xik · fk (y). Thus, the s-order within-group
CD-curve of group k for good i is given by: CDsik(y) =
∫ y
0
CDs−1ik (u)du.
How can we include an assumption improving fairness in an indirect
taxation environment? A possibility is to investigate the case of a per group
taxation design.
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Assumption 3.4: Taxation per Group. For any couple of goods {i, j} ∈
{1, . . . ,M}, each group of the population imposes his own tax rates. Then,
the tax rates ti and tj in group k are symbolized as, respectively:
tki , t
k
j ,∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (B3)
In order to combine the equal treatment of the groups (B2) with a per
group taxation assumption (B3), another differential efficiency parameter is
required.
Definition 3.5: Within-group Differential Efficiency. Suppose that
an efficiency parameter γ˜kij captures the marginal social cost of raising $1 of
public funds by taxing the j-th commodity in group k and using the proceeds
to subsidize the i-th commodity for the same group. In our M-good economy,
with i, j,m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}, B2 and B3 bring out:
γ˜kij = −
dtkj
dtki
(
Xjk
Xik
)
=
1 + 1
Xik
∑M
m=1 t
k
m
∂Xmk
∂tki
1 + 1
Xjk
∑M
m=1 t
k
m
∂Xmk
∂tkj
.
Now, by invoking the assumptions of additive poverty (A1) and differen-
tiability (A2), it is possible to state a Theorem with equal treatment of the
groups.
Theorem 3.6. Under conditions A1, A2, B2, and B3, the two following
propositions are equivalent:
(ı)
∑`
k=1[CD
s
ik(y)− γ˜kijCDsjk(y)] ≥ 0, ∀y ≤ z+k , ∀` ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}
(ıı) dP (F, z) ≤ 0, ∀zk ≤ z+k , ∀P (F, z) ∈ Πs, s ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
Proof. See the appendix.
This result is attractive since it allows one to decrease overall poverty if
and only if there is dominance of the sum of the within-group CD-curves for
good i (provided that those of good j are multiplied by γ˜kij).
4 The condition
is that we increase tkj for all k and use the proceeds to subsidize t
k
i for all k.
It turns out that, this taxation framework could provide consequential
freedom to decision makers in respect to the groups they decide to impose
4In the same manner as in Theorem 3.1, dominance within each group is not necessary
since the iff condition guarantees the dominance of the sum. For instance, if the CD-
curve of good i in the needier group dominates that of good j (multiplied by γ˜kij), and if
this dominance is strong enough to compensate for the non dominance within the other
groups, then overall poverty decreases and conversely.
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the fiscal reform. Indeed, poverty-reducing tax reforms may be performed by
taxing one or many groups without affecting the remainder of the population.
Corollary 3.7. Suppose dtki ≤ 0 and dtkj ≥ 0, and dt`i = dt`j = 0, ∀` 6=
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Then, [CDsik(y) − γ˜kijCDsjk(y)] ≥ 0 =⇒ dP (F, z) ≤ 0,
∀P (F, z) ∈ Πs, s ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
Proof. It is straightforward.
In other words, if decision makers behave in accordance with the result of
Theorem 3.6, and if a tax reform is only conducted in group k (tax-rate vari-
ations being nil in the other groups), then overall poverty declines. Accord-
ingly, theses per group taxation designs exhibit some incentive mechanisms.
For instance, in urban areas, it is possible to finance an increasing subsidy
on public transport by an increasing tax on fuel. This yields incentives
with overall poverty reduction provided the CD-curve of public transport
lies above that of fuel in this area (and provided the latter is multiplied by
γ˜kij), for any chosen order of stochastic dominance.
Now, imagine a tax reform is performed in group k where the number of
poor individuals is important. This may entail a weak incentive effect if the
proceeds issued from the fiscal revenue are low. Then, instead of increasing
the tax on the j-th commodity to subsidize the i-th commodity in the same
group, why not financing a decreasing tax in a poor group with a increasing
tax in a rich group? In such a taxation environment, both fiscal revenue and
fairness are improved.
Assumption 3.8: Fair Treatment of the Groups. Let Rk`ij be the per
capita indirect tax revenue obtained from group k and `. Revenue neutrality
is assumed to be the rule between groups k and `, if we finance a decreasing
tax on good i in group k by an increasing tax on good j in group `:
dRk`ij = 0, for any k, ` ∈ {1, . . . , K} and for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. (B4)
The fair treatment of the groups reinforces the per group taxation as-
sumption, improving fairness and flexibility in the taxation mechanism.
Given this assumption, we may redefine our economic efficiency ratio.
Definition 3.9: Between-group Differential Efficiency. Suppose that
an efficiency parameter γ̂k`ij captures the marginal social cost of raising $1 of
public funds by taxing the j-th commodity in group ` and using the proceeds
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to subsidize the i-th commodity in group k. In our M-good economy, with
i, j,m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}, B3 and B4 bring out:
γ̂`kij = −
dt`j
dtki
(
Xj`
Xik
)
=
θ`
[
1 + 1
Xj`
∑M
m=1 t
`
m
∂Xm`
∂t`j
]
θk
[
1 + 1
Xik
∑M
m=1 t
k
m
∂Xmk
∂tki
] .
Note that in the above definition, in contrast to the within-group effi-
ciency ratio, the between-group differential efficiency ratio includes popula-
tion shares of the groups concerned with the tax reform. Remember that a
(within-group) differential efficiency ratio gauges, under budget neutrality
condition, the per capita budgetary impact of the reform (in each group).
Consequently, in a two-group taxation framework, using the weights of pop-
ulation shares enables us to assess the total impact on the public budget.
Indeed, imagine we finance a decreasing tax on the i-th commodity in one
group (say k) with an increasing tax on the j-th commodity in another group
(say `). Then, if θ`  θk, the decreasing tax on good i in group k can be
performed with a very marginal growth of t`j.
Theorem 3.10. Under conditions A1, A2, B3, and B4, the two following
propositions are equivalent:
(ı) CDsik(y)− γ̂`kijCDsj`(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ≤ z+k , ∀` ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . , K}
(ıı) dP (F, z) ≤ 0, ∀P (F, z) ∈ Πs, s ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
Proof. See the appendix.
This result is very helpful to get poverty-reducing tax reforms with a two-
good taxation scheme. For instance, assume j represents all goods, whereas
i stands for housing expenditures. In Canada, as natives are exempted of
VAT, the project aiming at increasing subsidizes on i for natives may be
achieved with a slight increasing VAT on j for non natives.
Alternatively, this technique may be applied in the one-good case, which
is useful when we consider cross-price subsidies for public utilities between
different consumer groups.
Corollary 3.11. Under conditions A1, A2, B3, and B4, the two following
propositions are equivalent:
(ı) CDsik(y)− γ̂`kii CDsi`(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ≤ z+k , ∀` ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . , K}
(ıı) dP (F, z) ≤ 0, ∀P (F, z) ∈ Πs, s ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
Proof. See the appendix.
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Finally, contrary to the previous results, Theorem 3.10 and Corollary
3.11 allow to test for dominance with curves belonging to two different
groups. Therefore, a per group taxation model is relevant with between-
group transfers, provided that commodity consumptions in a given group
are more concentrated among the poor than in the other group.
4 Conclusion
Indirect tax reforms exert, throughout the use of within-group CD-curves,
a non-homogenous impact on the distributions of commodity expenditures
since the underlying per group taxation assumption yields modifications on
truncated parts of theses distributions. This confers decision makers the pos-
sibility to perform within-group transfers as well as between-group transfers
to reduce poverty in particular groups or to obtain an overall poverty alle-
viation. Between-group transfers are implemented in order to introduce a
fairness element into the indirect taxation system which strengthens the per
group taxation fashion.
This methodology can contribute to open the way on new topics. Indeed,
between-group indirect tax reforms may be studied to capture the impact
on the diminution of overall inequalities, of between-group inequalities using
the Gini index between populations of income receivers (see Dagum (1987)),
or to analyze mobility (see e.g. Van Kerm (2004)). Moreover, it would be
interesting to adapt these stochastic dominance tests in order to apprehend
the dynamics of reducing-poverty tax reforms as well as the efficiency of
the redistribution mechanism in measuring their significance over time with
Davidson and Duclos’s (2000) test.
Finally, the fact that poverty-reducing indirect tax reforms might be
analyzed with the nature of the goods (luxury goods or inferior goods) is
left for future researches.
Appendix
Proof. Theorem 3.1.
(ı) =⇒ (ıı): See Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2005a).
(ıı) =⇒ (ı): Let us take a set of functions pk
(
yE(q, y), zk
)
, for which the
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(s− 1)-th derivative is:
p
(s−1)
k
(
yE(q, y), zk
)
=

(−1)s−1  if y ≤ y
(−1)s−1 (y + − y) if y < y ≤ y + 
0 y > y + 
,∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}.
Poverty indices whose functions pk
(
yE(q, y), zk
)
have the above form for
p
(s−1)
k
(
yE(q, y), zk
)
belong to the class Πs. This yields:
p
(s)
k
(
yE(q, y), zk
)
=

0 if y ≤ y
(−1)s if y < y ≤ y + 
0 y > y + 
,∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}. (3)
Imagine now that
∑`
k=1 θk[C˜D
s
ik(y)−γC˜D
s
jk(y)] < 0 on an interval [y, y + ]
for some `, for y < z+` , and for  that can be arbitrarily close to 0. For
pk
(
yE(q, y), zk
)
indices with s-order derivatives defined as in (3), the mar-
ginal tax reform induces an increase of poverty. Hence it cannot be that∑`
k=1 θk[C˜D
s
ik(y) − γC˜D
s
jk(y)] < 0 for some `, y ∈ [y, y + ] when y < z+` .
This proves the necessity of the condition.
For the following demonstrations, one needs Abel’s lemma.
Lemma 4.1: Abel’s lemma (see Jenkins and Lambert (1993) and Duclos
et al. (2005)). Let xj and yi be two real variables. If xn ≥ xn−1 ≥ . . . ≥
x1 ≥ 0, then
∑n
i=j yi ≥ 0 ∀j is a sufficient condition for
∑n
i=1 xiyi ≥ 0.
Contrary to this, if xn ≤ xn−1 ≤ . . . ≤ x1 ≤ 0, then
∑n
i=j yi ≥ 0 ∀j is also
a sufficient condition for
∑n
i=1 xiyi ≤ 0.
Proof. Theorem 3.6.
(ı) =⇒ (ıı): In this context:
dpk(·) = −p(1)k (·)
[
xik(y)
Xik
− γ˜kij
xjk(y)
Xjk
]
Xikdt
k
i .
Now, remember that xik(y)
Xik
· f (y) = CD1ik(y), then:
dP (F, z) = −
K∑
k=1
(dtki θkXik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
λk
∫ a
0
p
(1)
k (·)
[
CD1ik(y)− γ˜kij CD1jk(y)
]
dy.
12
Along the line of Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2005a), integrating by parts∫ a
0
p
(1)
k (·)CD1ik s times and using an induction reasoning implies that:
dP (F, z) = (−1)s
K∑
k=1
λk
∫ a
0
p
(s)
k (·)
[
CDsik(y)− γ˜kij CDsjk(y)
]
dy
=
∫ a
0
K∑
k=1
λk(−1)sp(s)k (·)
[
CDsik(y)− γ˜kij CDsjk(y)
]
dy.
As dtki < 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, it can be noticed that λk ≤ 0, for
all k. Using Abel’s lemma, in order to get
∑K
k=1(−1)sp(s)k λk[CDsik(y) −
γ˜kij CD
s
jk(y)] ≤ 0, it is then sufficient to have
∑`
k=1[CD
s
ik(y)−γ˜kij CDsjk(y)] ≥
0, ∀` ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}. Thus, ∑`k=1[CDsik(y) − γ˜kij CDsjk(y)] ≥ 0, ∀` ∈
{1, 2, . . . , K}, ∀y ∈ [0, z+k ], implies dP (F, z) ≤ 0.
(ıı) =⇒ (ı): The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 3.1.
Proof. Theorem 3.10 and Corollary 3.11.
(ı) =⇒ (ıı): We only present the sufficiency of Theorem 3.10, that of
Corollary 3.11 being a particular case for j = i. In this context, we have:
dpk(·) = −p(1)k (·)
[
xik(y)
Xik
]
Xikdt
k
i
and,
dpj(·) = −p(1)j (·)
[
−γ̂`kij
xjk(y)
Xjk
]
Xikdt
k
i .
This entails:
dP (F, z) = −
[
λk
∫ a
0
p
(1)
k (·)CD1ik(y)dy − λkγ̂`kij
∫ a
0
p
(1)
k (·)CD1jk(y)dy
]
.
The remaining of the proof is straightforward if we apply the result of The-
orem 3.6.
(ıı) =⇒ (ı): The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 3.1.
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